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This Article points to key elements of Critical 
Infrastructure Resilience (CIR) and how they differ 
from Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). CIP is 
still very important and one of the key systems that 
the society relies upon to ensure the continuity of 
operation of CI. However, CIP cannot predict an 
adequate number of major threats that would 
allow to conduct the preparedness and response 
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at the level which would ensure the sufficient 
operation of CI in all cases. In that sense CIR sets 
a new paradigm with a quality that reduces 
vulnerability, minimizes the consequences of 
threats, accelerates response and recovery, and 
facilitates adaptation to a disruptive event. Some 
selected concepts of CIR with examples are 
presented in the Article that should assist in further 
development and enhancement of resilience of 
subsystems and infrastructures as a whole, 
resulting in more secure CI. 
Key words: critical infrastructure, protection, 
resilience, vulnerability, adaptability 
 
Introduction 
Critical Infrastructure Resilience (CIR) is the latest segment 
of activities and measures aiming to ensure the continuity of 
operation of critical infrastructures (CI). Combination of 
importance and vulnerability of CI was recognized as the 
serious issue in 90ties in the United States and various steps 
have been taken from that time till today to secure CI and its 
operation. 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is a concept that relates 
to the preparedness and response to serious incidents that 
involve the critical infrastructure of a region or nation. In 
Europe, the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (EPCIP) refers to the doctrine or specific programs 
created as a result of the European Commission's directive 
EU COM(2006) 786 which designates European critical 
infrastructure that, in case of fault, incident, or attack, could 
impact both the country where it is hosted and at least one 
other European Member State. Member states are obliged to 
adopt the 2006 directive into their national statutes2. 
However, it is very difficult to predict an adequate number of 
major threats that would allow conducting the preparedness 
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 and response at the level which would ensure the sufficient 
operation of CI under any circumstances. Therefore, to cover 
for the unexpected in that domain, the Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience (CIR) concept has been developed. This review 
article presents the current situation in CIR field with selected 
examples.  
Review of Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Critical infrastructure (CI) involves elements that are 
fundamental to the normal operations of the human society. 
Resilience can be defined as the capacity to prevent, adapt, 
withstand and recover swiftly from both intentional and 
unintentional attacks. To achieve research objectives, a 
systematic review approach [Grant & Booth, 2009] can be 
used to identify and select related and relevant literature 
sources. This review technique can guarantee the quality and 
reliability of selected articles. 
CIP approaches were analyzed based on obtained 
information obtained about them from bibliographic 
literatures: reports, articles, white papers and guideline to 
arrive at informed insights [DHS, 2013]. 
What seems new and perhaps not well reflected – at least 
directly in most of the critical infrastructure modeling and 
security approaches (tools, techniques, and methodologies) – 
is the concept of addressing ‘resilience’. Most CIP 
approaches reviewed mainly focus on exploring concepts and 
phenomena related to security, reliability, dependability and 
risks in CIs.  The first type of resilience that was added to the 
inoperability input-output modeling (IIM) is restorative 
resilience or the speed of recovery after a disruption, including 
this type of resilience changes the static IIM into a DIIM 
(Dynamic IIM) [Alcaraz & Zeadally, 2015]. 
A second type of economic resilience is “adaptive resilience” 
which refers to the change in the speed of recovery of a sector 
during the recovery period. One category of key assets 
comprises the diverse array of national monuments, symbols, 
and icons that represent our Nation’s heritage, traditions and 
values, and political power. Identifying and prioritizing which 
assets of an infrastructure are most essential to its function, 
or pose the most significant danger to life and property if 
threatened or damaged, is necessary for developing an 


















































The European Commission has taken the initiative to 
organize a network consisting of research and technology 
organizations within the European Union (EU) with 
capabilities in critical infrastructure protection. Preparatory 
studies and road mapping were carried out in 2009–2010 by 
the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre on behalf 
of the Directorate-General for Home Affairs. The 
characteristics were planned on the basis of the priorities of 
the EU member state governments and critical infrastructure 
stakeholders, and in coherence with EU critical infrastructure 
protection policy in general. The network of laboratories is 
called the European Reference Network for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP). It is intended to be a long-
term, sustainable grouping with a light management structure 
based on existing European laboratories and facilities. Its 
main objectives are to agree on common test methodologies 
and standards, recommend security certification schemes, 
develop methods for laboratory accreditation, promote the 
exchange of good and best practices for critical infrastructure 
protection, and help the development of a single market in the 
EU for critical infrastructure protection related products and 
services [Lewis et al., 2013]. 
Selected concepts of Critical Infrastructure Resilience 
Resilience in a critical infrastructure system can be viewed as 
a quality that reduces vulnerability, minimizes the 
consequences of threats, accelerates response and recovery, 
and facilitates adaptation to a disruptive event. Resilience is 
defined in Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary as “the ability to 
bounce or spring back into shape, position, etc., after being 
pressed or stretched.”  Definitions vary slight, but they all link 
the concept of resilience to recovery after physical stress. The 
development and subsequent strengthening of the resilience 
of any set of critical infrastructure subsystems is a painstaking 
process in terms of design, time, and resources, and one that 
requires clearly defined initial as well as functional conditions. 
Defining such conditions can be understood as the overall 
concept of resilience for these subsystems in a critical 
infrastructure system [Ouyang, 2014]. 
The setting of the management process for protecting critical 
infrastructure elements, comprising the framework for 
strengthening resilience, can be regarded as the principal 
initial condition.  Conversely, the fundamental functional 
condition is the unambiguous specification and perception of 








































 Designation of critical infrastructure elements is the initial sub-
process of protection management. This sub-process hinges 
on the correct setting of criteria for designation of critical 
infrastructure elements on the European, national, and 
regional levels. In this phase of the process, it is equally 
important to consider the suitability of implementing an 
appropriate approach to element designation, which can be 
based on either the top-down or the bottom-up principle. 
The fundamental functional condition for strengthening the 
resilience of critical infrastructure subsystems is the 
unambiguous specification and perception of factors that 
determine it. In this context, the resilience of a critical 
infrastructure system must be understood as a cyclic process 
of continual improvement of prevention, absorption, recovery, 
and adaptation. 
The first phase of the critical infrastructure resilience cycle is 
prevention. Absorption is initiated if a subsystem is impaired 
due to a disruptive event, and is determined by the robustness 
of the critical infrastructure subsystem. The recovery phase 
starts after the effects of a disruptive event have worn off. This 
phase is characterized by recoverability, which is the capacity 
of a subsystem to recover its function to the original and/or 
required level of performance. The final phase of the critical 
infrastructure resilience cycle is adaptation, which is 
essentially the ability of an organization to adapt an operated 
subsystem to the potential recurrence of a disruptive event—
i.e., to learn from previous disruptive events. 
Critical infrastructure subsystem resilience can be understood 
as a condition formed by three types of factors: 1) Factors 
determining resilience (i.e., components and variables of 
technical and organizational resilience); 2) factors limiting 
resilience (i.e., statutory regulation of the operation of 
infrastructure or the level of available financial resources); 
and 3) factors affecting resilience (i.e., threats or resilience 
strengthening instruments). 
-  Factors Determining Robustness: Robustness is the ability 
of an element to absorb the impacts of a disruptive event. 
These impacts may be absorbed via the structural qualities of 
buildings or the technologies used (i.e., structural robustness) 
and/or via security measures (i.e., security robustness). 
- Factors Determining Recoverability: Recoverability is the 
capacity of an element to recover its function to the original 


















































event have ended. With respect to critical infrastructure, 
recoverability is understood as reparability, in which case, 
only the damaged or destroyed components of an element 
are repaired or replaced. 
- Factors Determining Adaptability: Adaptability is the ability 
of a critical infrastructure operator (i.e., an organization) to 
prepare an element for the recurring effects of a previous 
disruptive event. Adaptability is determined by the internal 
processes of an organization focused on creating optimal 
conditions for the strengthening of resilience.  
Element resilience affects the dynamics of the performance 
of the services provided by an element in response to a 
disruptive event [Tague, 2005], [Twidale & Floyd, 2008]. 
Critical infrastructure system resilience is also defined as the 
ability to absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a 
potentially disruptive event. In this context, it can be 
understood as a condition closely related to the performance 
function of individual subsystems. The strengthening of 
resilience is based on the continual enhancement of the level 
of factors which determine it [Denyer, 2017]. Sustained 
attention should be devoted to these factors in the areas of 
both technical resilience (i.e., robustness and recoverability) 
and organizational resilience (i.e., adaptability). At the same 
time, it is equally important also to reflection factors hindering 
resilience (i.e., statutory regulation of the infrastructure’s 
operation or the availability of financial resources) and factors 
that affect it (i.e., threats or resilience strengthening 
instruments).  These principles are usually acceptable across 
individual sectors of critical infrastructure.  
However, in order to implement the evaluation system 
effectively, it is essential that this accord also manifests at 
deeper levels, such as the level of individual resilience 
factors, the action of which varies significantly in different 
critical infrastructure sectors [ISO 31000, 2018]. 
CIR activities and examples 
In systems engineering, the goal of the architecting process 
is to reduce ambiguity and narrow the alternative solution 
space. In infrastructure systems, ambiguity exists in the 
functional and logical interrelationships that exist across 
system boundaries, and in the definition and application of 








































 systems, networks and assets that provide vital services and 
capabilities to the served population. Critical infrastructure is 
characterized by the functions of the segments that comprise 
it and the interrelationships that exist across those segments 
[DHS - Critical infrastructure]. 
Critical infrastructure systems are vulnerable to disruptive 
events. Disruptive events result from natural or man-made 
disasters and other catastrophic events which degrade 
system performance with respect to a Key Performance 
Indicator (KPI). Critical Infrastructure Segments: Dams 
(Agriculture and Food & Defense Industrial Base), Water 
(Postal and Shipping & Critical Manufacturing), Energy 
(Banking and Finance & Nuclear Reactors, Materials and 
Waste), Communication (Transportation Systems & 
Healthcare and Public Health), Chemical (Government 
Facilities & Commercial Facilities), Emergency Services 
(National Monuments & Information Technology). 
Infrastructure segments that provide services which address 
the basic needs of the served population are those in which 
resilience is most important. This is similar to the individual 
satisfying Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. "A Fuzzy Approach 
for Assessing Architecture Resilience"; Important functional, 
logical and operational interdependencies are often 
overlooked by existing modeling approaches [Kujawski, 
2006], [Rinaldi et al., 2001]. The functional relationships and 
logical dependencies that are woven throughout these 
systems dictate how well each segment can perform, and the 
degree to which services are rendered for other infrastructure 
segments. 
Fuzzy logic is approached in a two-step process: 
1. Identify infrastructure segments where resilience is 
apriority architecture attribute using expert judgment for 
functional, logical and operational interdependencies in 
concert with inoperability input-output modeling (IIM), 
dynamic IIM, or other existing interdependency analysis 
methods. 
2. Assess infrastructure architecture resilience using a fuzzy 
rule set tailored to the specific resilience metrics and 
characteristics most appropriate to the infrastructure 
architecture under consideration.  
Several methods have been developed to forecast the 
impacts of a disruptive event using information about the 


















































throughout the system. Using the results from the IIM, 
infrastructure segments can be prioritized based on the 
dependencies that exist across the infrastructure system. This 
methodology does not require any changes to the 
inoperability modeling methodology selected from among 
[Haimes et al., 2005], [Lian & Haimes, 2006] or [Kujawski, 
2006].  
"Application of the Fuzzy Architecture Assessment"; 
Alternative methods have been proposed to identify key 
infrastructure segments through the expected impacts 
resulting from a disruptive event [Haimes et al., 2005], [Lian 
& Haimes, 2006] or [Kujawski, 2006]. The results of these 
approaches are used to prioritize the identification of, and 
investment in, more resilient architecture alternatives that 
better support the services provided by these systems in the 
face of disruptive events. This approach requires the 
definition of resilience attributes and the mapping of fuzzy 
membership functions to each attribute. These attributes can 
be ascribed by operators and subject matter experts by 
clearly defining the relationships that exist across the 
infrastructure within the contexts of the performed functions. 
Resilience attributes of adaptability and redundancy are 
considered for the example architecture assessment 
[Jackson, 2007]. 
A fuzzy approach accommodates ambiguity in the 
assessment of key system attributes, and brings together 
different measurement scales to provide a combined 
outcome. For the architecture assessment, these differences 
are implemented by differentiating the fuzzy membership 
functions associated with the resilience attributes that are key 
to each infrastructure segment. IF adaptability is high AND 
robustness is moderate THEN resilience is high; IF 
adaptability is moderate AND robustness is moderate THEN 
resilience is low; IF adaptability is high AND robustness is 
high THEN resilience is high. For defuzzification, each 
satisfied antecedent block is evaluated and produces the 
membership for the resilience consequent. The degree of 
membership for each fuzzy resilience set is evaluated using 
the mean of maximum defuzzification rule [Muller, 2012].  
As the interesting example of current CIR there is an article 
which review s the responses of four of the five Nordic 
countries to this challenge, namely Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden. The article analyzes their strategies and 








































 differences. In so doing, it argues that these countries have a 
better starting point for the task of making their critical 
infrastructure resilient than most of the EU. This is due to the 
fact that even before the resilience debate emerged, these 
countries had based their policies on securing vital societal 
functions rather than the individual infrastructures that support 
these functions. The article concludes that some kind of 
Nordic model can really be identified when it comes to 
approaches towards critical infrastructure resilience 
[Pursiainen, 2018]. 
It has been widely reported that industrial control systems 
underpinning critical infrastructures ranging from power plants 
to oil refineries are vulnerable to cyber attacks. A slew of 
counter measures have been proposed to secure these 
systems, but their adoption has been disappointingly slow 
according to many experts. Operators have been reluctant to 
spend large sums of money to protect against threats that 
have only rarely materialized as attacks. But many security 
countermeasures are dual-use, in that they help protect 
against service failures caused by hackers and by accidents. 
In many critical infrastructure sectors, accidents caused by 
equipment failures and nature occur regularly, and 
investments for detecting and possibly preventing accidents 
and attacks could be more easily justified than investments 
for detecting and preventing attacks alone [Papa et al., 2013]. 
Conclusions 
In regard to Critical Infrastructure security and operation, 
there has been a shift in emphasis in recent years from 
protection to resilience. CIP remains in focus and still is one 
of the key systems that the society relies upon to ensure the 
continuity of operation of CI. One of the good examples is the 
European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (ERNCIP) However, the shift in emphasis towards 
resilience reflects the acknowledgment that complete 
protection is impossible to achieve and that the level of efforts 
required organizing and maintaining the desired level of 
protection is not cost-effective in relation to risks and 
vulnerabilities.  
CI systems are very different in their structures and ways of 
operation. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) and Critical 
Infrastructure Resilience (CIR) activities are further 
complicated by CI interdependencies, cascade effects and 


















































the global level in relation to CIP and CIR, with emphasize on 
the latter. Selected concepts of CIR with examples, as 
presented in this Article, should assist that goal.  
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